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Abstract
We dene a model with two countries and two vertically di¤erentiated goods, a high
and a low quality variant, and heterogenous consumers with respect to their willingness to
pay for quality. Consumers in one country are ethnocentric in consumption. They thrive
additional satisfaction when consuming a domestic good rather than a foreign one, since
only the former can satisfy their sense of place. We investigate the role of trade costs and
ethnocentric attitude in shaping the equilibrium conguration of the international duopoly.
Keywords: home bias, relative preferences, vertically di¤erentiated model
JEL Classication: D43, F10, F15.
1 Introduction
Consumption home bias is a well documented phenomenon in existing empirical literature (see
for instance Chen, 2004 and Morey, 2016). Surprisingly, there is no formal model explaining
this issue. In this paper, we propose an international duopoly model that captures the market
e¤ects of home bias. There are several causes put forward to explain the existence of consumption
home bias. First, it is often assumed that home bias arises due to the willingness of protecting
local employment that otherwise would be reduced in favor of foreign workers. Another reason
evoked would be that information about the quality of the domestic products is better than the
one obtained on foreign ones. Furthermore, it is argued that geographical frictions generating
important trade costs hinder trade and favor local goods. Moreover, consuming local goods has
become a campaign of environmentalistsmovements who argue that transportation of goods is
one of the most polluting activities.
Finally, we believe that a major force behind consumption home bias is driven by a cultural
component. As a reaction against a borderless world, nationalist movements have pushed forward
the idea of ethnic and national identities. With the aim of preserving the traditional values of
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a country, they tend to generate di¢ dence and refusal of others and to emphasize cross-country
di¤erences. "In general, the concept of ethnocentrism represents the universal inclination of people
to view their own group as the center of the universe, to interpret other social groups from the
perspective of their own group, and to reject individuals who are culturally dissimilar while blindly
accepting those who are culturally like themselves. The symbols and values of ones own ethnic
or national group become objects of pride and attachment, whereas symbols of other groups may
become objects of contempt" (Shimp and Sharma, 280, 1987). A particular illustration of such
"populist" views is reected in consumer ethnocentrism. Under consumer ethnocentrism, goods
become a means to conrm a culture, a sense of place (Cresswell, 2005). Ethnocentric consumers
attribute a moral meaning to consumption: purchasing foreign products is viewed as a blamewor-
thy behavior generating a dangerous mix of cultures and weakening thereby the ethnic identity of
a country. Of course, conferring to goods a moral, social and cultural content adds to the typical
drivers of consumption - price and quality of products - a further dimension, opening the door to a
priori unexpected market congurations. When goods become conspicuous products, consumers
may choose more expensive items which at rst sight do not provide a better quality or perfor-
mance. These goods are chosen mainly because of their conspicuous nature. When consuming
these items, people feel to belong to a community. They are aware to obtain a cultural or ethnic
identity, putting them far away from foreign citizens. For this identity, they are eventually willing
to pay a price premium.1
In this paper, we provide a theoretical setting that captures key features of ethnocentric con-
sumption and analyze their consequences on market prices and quantities. The key question of our
analysis is how a market equilibrium is dened when international trade conicts with ethnocentric
consumption. This conict arises since trade is meant to develop cross-border exchanges of goods
whereas ethnocentric consumption favors domestic consumption. This analysis seems particularly
relevant when foreign and domestic goods display signicant quality di¤erences: it is along these
goods features that consumer ethnocentrism develops, citizens in each country identifying the
quality of the good with the "quality" of the country they belong to.
In order to disentangle this issue, we dene a partial equilibrium model with two countries and
two vertically di¤erentiated goods, a high and a low quality good.2 Consumers in each country
are heterogenous with respect to their willingness to pay for quality. Each country is populated
by a rm. Each rm exports its product thereby facing an iceberg cost. Introducing this cost in
the model enables to consider how the protability to produce a good changes when trade gets
more and more intense. We assume that consumers in one country attribute a social content to
the goods. In particular, they thrive additional satisfaction when consuming a domestic good
rather than a foreign one, since only the former can satisfy their sense of place. By contrast,
they su¤er a psychological penalty if they consume the foreign product. Borrowing from the
literature of conspicuous consumption and relative preferences, we capture the social benet and
the social penalty through the quality gap between variants and can be interpreted as a proxy of
cultural distance between countries. We assume that consumers in the other country do not have
any concern with respect to cultural content of products and only judge the intrinsic quality of
1Since Veblen (1899), in the theory of conspicuous consumption the utility (or status) of a consumer depends
on the comparison between her own consumption decision and that of others. Under conspicuous consumption,
consumers are willing to pay a price premium for a functionally equivalent good for signalling their wealth or other
specic characteristics, such as culture or religious attitude.
2A good survey of the industrial organisation models nested with international trade is Krugman (1989).
2
variants.
Accordingly, under the assumption of country-specic relative preferences, we characterize the
equilibrium conguration of the international duopoly. In particular, we rst describe the role of
these preferences capturing the ethnocentric consumption by comparing this equilibrium with a
baseline where relative preferences are absent. Second, we compare the two equilibria arising with
and without ethnocentric consumption. Finally, we study the e¤ect of a trade cost reduction on
the equilibrium conguration.
We consider di¤erent scenarios. After presenting the related literature (Section 2), we provide
the presentation of the model in Section 3 and the description of the setup without relative
preferences in Section 4. In Section 5, we rst characterize the scenario where consumers in the
country where the high-quality good is produced display relative preferences, and then the reverse
case with ethnocentric consumers being in the country where the low quality good is produced
(Section 6). Then, we conclude in Section 7.
2 Related literature
Our analysis develops along several research lines. The key ingredient that consumers have a
social identity stems from Tajfel and Turner (1979)s pioneristic contribution to psychology. They
formulate a process for a social identity to be dened so that people are putted in categories and
then they are contrasted with other groups, thereby generating a sense of place. This perspective
is at rst sight far from the mainstream view in economics postulating the existence of a rational
and selsh agent with given preferences. Still, it has opened the door among economists to the
analysis of social interaction in shaping collective values, preferences and economic behavior. In
90s Akerlof introduces the notion of social decision in economic theory and describe the process
through which people choose their position in a social space.3 In a companion stream of literature
on endogenous preferences, Bowles (1998) analyses the e¤ects of institution on preferences, which
are considered to be endogenously determined. Later, Benabou and Tirole (2006) emphasize the
role of beliefs as drivers for a pro-social behavior.
Starting from these contributions, we shift the focus of our analysis on the e¤ect of social
identity on economic choices when trade coexists with an ethnocentric culture. 4 Finally, in order
to formalize the analysis, we borrow the notion of relative preferences adopted by Ben Elhadj et
al. (2015). In their setting of vertical di¤erentiation à la Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Gabszewicz
and Thisse(1979), consumers value a good along a relative dimension: its relative quality, namely
the quality gap with respect to another adjacent variant, determines its ranking along a social
ladder and, thus, its economic price. We add to this formalization, a further component which
captures consumersethnocentric feelings and assume that this component is country-specic.
Last, even though we use a very di¤erent setting, our paper is related to existing literature
on quality and international trade. Quality and trade literature has considerably expanded since
the seminal paper by Linder (1961) showing that product quality matters in the trade patterns
among trading partners (Hummels and Klenow, 2005; Verhoogen, 2008; Khandelwal, 2010; Hallak
and Schott, 2011; Baldwin and Harrigan, 2011; Fajgebaum et al, 2011). Existing papers have also
3See also Akerlof (1997), Akerlof and Kranton (2000) for a formal notion of identity, as a persons sense of self.
4The idea that consumers may be reluctant to buy foreign product is not recent. It has been introduced by
Shimp and Sharma (1987) through the notion of ethnocentrism. In their seminal paper, the authors emphasize the
role of in-group a¢ liation and belief in the morality of domestic consumption.
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analysed how trade liberalization a¤ects quality choice when countries are asymmetric (Cabrales
and Motta, 2001). The focus of our paper is on preferences with home bias and how they interplay
with trade costs.
3 The model
Consider a two-country model with two vertically di¤erentiated goods. Each country is populated
by a single rm. We label h and l each country and the corresponding rm within the country. The
h (resp. l) rm produces the high (resp. low) quality variant uH (resp. uL). The range of quality
is in the interval [u; u] where u is the highest quality level that is technologically feasible and u > 0
is the lowest one. Each rm can serve both countries. When serving the foreign market, it incurs
iceberg trade costs t; 1  t  0. From the rms viewpoint, this trade cost creates a gap between
the quantity produced to serve the foreign market and the one generating prots. When t is closer
to 1, trade costs are relatively low and the quantity produced to serve the foreign market tends
to coincide with the one determining prots. When t is close to 0, the gap between the quantity
which could possibly generate prots and the one targeted to the foreign market is relevant.
As for the demand side, in each country, consumers are characterized by their willingness to
pay for quality indexed by , uniformly distributed over the interval [a; b] : Parameter b denotes the
highest willingness to pay for quality. Assuming that countries do not di¤er in their willingness
to pay enables us to focus on the role of attitude toward local/foreign goods as unique driver to a
change in the equilibrium conguration with respect to a standard vertical product di¤erentiation
setting.
4 The baseline scenario: absence of home bias
We rst consider a closed economy scenario where, in absence of trade, a monopoly in country i
only serves the domestic market i; i = h; l: Consumers display the same preferences with respect
to variants, so that their indirect utility function Ui () writes as
Ui () =
8<:
uh   ph if she buys h
ul   pl if she buys l
0 otherwise
(1)
In this case, the indi¤erent consumer between buying variant i and not buying at all is ^i =
pi
qi
with i = h; l: Then, it is immediate that, at equilibrium, price and quantity pAi and q
A
i are:
pAh =
1
2
uhb and pAl =
1
2
uhb
xAh =
1
2
b and xAl =
1
2
b;
where the subscript A stands for autarky.
In the case of open economies the market structure is a duopoly with rms competing in an
international economy. The corresponding demand function of each rm can be written as follows
xh(ph; pl) = t(b  ph   pl
uh   ul ) +

b  ph   pl
uh   ul

xl(ph; pl) =

ph   pl
uh   ul   a

+ t(
ph   pl
uh   ul   a)
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Maximizing prot i = pixi(pi; pj); i; j = h; l, i 6= j; of rm i yields the candidate equilibrium
prices
ph =
1
3
(2b  a) (uh   ul)
pl =
1
3
(b  2a) (uh   ul) :
Notice that equilibrium prices do not depend on iceberg costs which only a¤ect the quantity sold
in each country.
The corresponding demands at equilibrium write as
xh =
1
3
(t+ 1) (2b  a) and xl = 13 (t+ 1) (b  2a) :
In this setting, the typical e¤ects of trade on the equilibrium conguration emerge so that the
equilibrium prices of the variants decrease and the corresponding demands raise as trade gets more
and more liberalized.
5 Home bias in country h
Now, we move to consider a di¤erent setting where each variant is evaluated not only on the basis
of its intrinsic quality but also in term of its sociocultural content. More specically, we assume
that consumers in country h thrive additional satisfaction when consuming the locally produced
good h. This good represents the national cultural: its buyer feel to protect a national identity. By
contrast, they incur a psychological su¤ering when consuming the foreign good l. This su¤ering
is not due to the lower quality l wrt h; but to the awareness that this variant is produced by a
foreign rm instead of a national one. Accordingly, this consumption choice benets the foreign
producer and indirectly spread a di¤erent cultural from the national one. To formalize these ideas,
we use a vertical di¤erentiation model à la Mussa and Rosen, with relative preferences, nested
with a cultural component, namely an ethnocentric attitude. Thus, the utility function Uh () of
a h consumer is given by
Uh () =

uh   ph + (buh   ul) if she buys h
ul   pl   (puh   ul) if she buys l (2)
This h consumer who consumes good h has an additional utility benet given by (buh  
ul);whereas when she buys l; she su¤ers a psychological frustration measured by (puh   ul):
Parameter  magnies the sociocultural component independently whether this is a benet or a
frustration. It captures the intensity of these social feelings. Parameter j, j = b; p captures the
feelings of satisfaction, say a benet, b or frustration, say a penalty, p generated by consuming
variant h or l; respectively. We assume that the social component (buh   ul) is di¤erent from
the psychological penalty (puh   ul):  > b > p > 1 >   0:
To guarantee that the utility level of a native consumer buying the good l is a priori positive
(i.e. ul   (puh   ul) > 0), it must hold that
+ 

ul
uh
> p:
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In country l; consumers do not attribute any cultural content to consumption. Accordingly, they
choose the variant depending on the quality and the corresponding price. Thus, the utility function
of a consumer in country l is
U l () =

uh   ph if she buys h
ul   pl if she buys l :
In line with the traditional model of vertical product di¤erentiation, the marginal consumer in
each group h (ph; pl) and l (ph; pl) ; respectively write as
h (ph; pl) =
ph   pl   
 
uh
 
b + p
  2ul
uh   ul
l (ph; pl) =
ph   pl
uh   ul
If  = 0; we recover the traditional expression of the marginal consumer in the vertical di¤erenti-
ation model. In this framework, the demand functions faced by rms h and l write, respectively,
as:
xh = (b  h (ph; pl)) + t(b  l (ph; pl))
xl = t(h (ph; pl)  a) + (l (ph; pl)  a):
Maximizing the prot function of rm i; i = xipi; with i = h; l we get the optimal price pi :
ph =
 
(t+ 1) (uh   ul) (2b  a)  
  2ul + buh + puh (t  2)
3t+ 3
pl =
(b  2a) (t+ 1) (uh   ul)  
  2ul + buh + puh (2t  1)
3t+ 3
and then the corresponding optimal quantity xi
xh =
((2b  a) (t+ 1) (uh   ul)) 
 

  2ul + buh + puh (t  2)
3(uh   ul)
xl =
(b  2a) (t+ 1) (uh   ul) 
 
2ul   buh   puh

3(uh   ul)
It is interesting to determine the role of home bias and trade costs in determining the new
equilibrium conguration. With respect to home bias scenario, we can write the following:
Proposition 1 Whatever the level of trade costs, home bias raises the equilibrium price of the
high-quality variant and the corresponding quantity with respect to the baseline. The equilibrium
quantity of the low quality variant raises too, although its price increases i¤ trade costs are not too
high (i.e. t < 1
2
).
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Proof. @p

h
@
=  1
3
(t  2)  2ul+buh+puh
t+1
> 0; @p

h
@b
=
@ph
@p
= 1
3
uh
2 t
t+1
> 0
@pl
@
= 1
3
(1  2t)  2ul+buh+puh
t+1
T 0 , (1  2t) T 0 and @pl
@b
=
@pl
@p
= 1
3
uh
1 2t
t+1
T 0 ,
(1  2t) T 0
@xh
@
=  1
3
(t  2)  2ul+buh+puh
uh ul > 0;
@xh
@b
=
@xh
@p
= 1
3
uh
2 t
uh ul > 0
@xl
@
= 1
3
 2ul+buh+puh
uh ul > 0;
@xl
@b
=
@xl
@p
= 1
3
 uh
uh ul
The economic intuition underlying the above ndings can be summarized as follows. Due to
the psychological benet that consuming variant h confers to its buyers, under home bias the price
of this variant raises. Still, contrary to the standard case, the corresponding quantity does not
decrease. These feelings enlarge the market share of the high-quality producer, which thus can
obtain higher prots at equilibrium.
As far as the e¤ect of  on the price pl ; this develops along two dimensions: A rst direct
e¤ect is such that when the low quality variant is marketed in a country where consumers su¤er a
frustration with respect to the foreign good, the foreign producer l is induced to x a lower price
in order to sell the product. The second is an indirect e¤ect: home bias pushes upward the price
of the high quality variant. Since price are strategic complements, the higher the equilibrium price
ph ; the higher p
:
l : This latter e¤ect prevails when trade is not very liberalized, namely when the
frustration su¤ered by consumers in h is somehow weakened by trade barriers. Interestingly, the
corresponding quantity xl raises with  both when
@pl
@
 0 and @pl
@
> 0: The increase of xl in
the case of @p

l
@
 0 is not surprising. Under @pl
@
> 0 the raise can be explained by taking into
account that this scenario only arises when (1  2t) > 0 namely when trade costs are high.
When considering the role of trade costs, dening   (uh ul)(2b a)
uh(b+p) 2ul
;we observe that
Proposition 2 A reduction of trade costs (i) increases the quantity sold by rm H i¤  < ;
it increases the quantity sold of rm L whatever the value of ;(ii) it decreases the price of both
goods.
Proof. @p

h
@t
= d
dt

((t+1)(uh ul)(2b a) ( 2ul+buh+puh)(t 2))
3t+3

= 
2ul buh puh
(t+1)2
< 0
@pl
@t
= d
dt

(b 2a)(t+1)(uh ul) ( 2ul+buh+puh)(2t 1)
3t+3

= 
2ul buh puh
(t+1)2
< 0
@xh
@t
= d
dt

((2b a)(t+1)(uh ul)) (( 2ul+buh+puh)(t 2))
3(uh ul)

= 1
3
(2b a)(uh ul) ((b+p)uh 2ul)
uh ul R 0 ,
 S (uh ul)(2b a)
uh(b+p) 2ul
@xl
@t
= d
dt

(b 2a)(t+1)(uh ul) (2ul buh puh)
3(uh ul)

= 1
3
(b  2a) > 0
It is worth noticing that when trade gets more liberalized, the optimal quantity of variant
h raises if and only if the social component of consumption is su¢ ciently weak, namely  < .
Indeed, in this case, the upward movement of price ph due to the sociocultural driver is not very
signicant and the traditional e¤ect of expanding demand can be observed under trade costs
reduction. On the contrary, when the sociocultural driver is strong (  ); the price of the high
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quality variant is pushed upward to such an extent that the reduction of trade costs cannot favour
a demand expansion of this variant.
Interestingly, the reduction of trade costs and home bias exert opposite e¤ect on the equilib-
rium prices and possibly on the demand of the high-quality variant. Comparing this equilibrium
conguration with the benchmark of open economy enables to identify the relative strength of
these drivers:
Proposition 3 When trade costs are low, the demand of goods at equilibrium and the price of the
high quality variant are higher under home bias than in the benchmark, whereas the price of the
low-quality variant is higher under home bias if and only if trade costs are high.
Proof. ph   ph = 13
  2ul + buh + puh 2 tt+1 > 0;
pl   pl = 13
  2ul + buh + puh 1 2tt+1 > 0() 1  2t > 0;
xh   xh =  13
  2ul + buh + puh t 2uh ul > 0 and nally
xl   xl = 13
 2ul+buh+puh
uh ul > 0
Hence, we can conclude that the typical benecial e¤ect of trade, namely a larger demand at
lower price, can be o¤set by a home bias component of culture. Indeed, when an ethnocentric
country producing a high quality good exchange with country producing a low-quality good, a
larger demand of products can come at expenses of higher prices.
6 Home bias in country l
In this section, we consider an alternative scenario when consumers in country l attribute a
sociocultural content to their consumption. More precisely, they thrive additional satisfaction
when consuming their own good rather than the one produced in the competing country h. By
contrast, they su¤er a psychological penalty when consuming the variant uh. Formally, the utility
function of a l-consumer is given by
U l () =

uh   ph   ( pul   uh) if she buys h
ul   pl + ( bul   uh) if she buys l: (3)
The consumer who consumes good l has an additional utility benet given by ( bul uh);whereas
when she buys l; then she su¤ers frustration measured by ( pul uh); with  j; j = B;P capturing
the benet of the frustration. We keep that the social benet component ( bul   uh) is di¤erent
from the psychological penalty when consuming the foreign good. To guarantee that the utility
level of a consumer buying the good h is a priori larger than the utility level of buying l (i.e.
uh   ( pul   uh) > ul   pl + ( bul   uh)), it must hold that
((uh   ul) + (2uh    bul)
ul
>  p: (4)
We assume that h-consumers do not perceive any social driver when choosing what to consume.
Thus, the utility function of a h-consumer is
Uh () =

uh   ph if she buys h
ul   pl if she buys l :
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In line with the traditional model of vertical product di¤erentiation, the marginal consumer in
each group l (ph; pl) and h (ph; pl) ; respectively write as,
l (ph; pl) =
ph   pl +  (ul ( b +  p)  2uh)
uh   ul
h (ph; pl) =
ph   pl
uh   ul
In this framework, the demand functions faced by rms h and l write, respectively, as:
xh = (b  h (ph; pl)) + t(b  l (ph; pl))
xl = t(h (ph; pl)  a) + (l (ph; pl)  a):
Maximizing the prot function of rm i; i = xipi; with i = h; l we get the optimal price pi :
ph =
(t+ 1) (uh   ul) (2b  a) + (ul   2tul) ( b +  p) + 2uh (2t  1)
3t+ 3
pl =
(t+ 1) (uh   ul) (b  2a) + ul((2  t) ( b +  p))  2uh (2  t)
3t+ 3
Comparing the two optimal prices, we check that ph > p

l ; since p

h   pl under the condition
(4) boils down to 1
3
(uh   ul) (a+ b  ) which is always positive.
Thus the corresponding equilibrium quantities xi ; i = h; l write as
xh =
(2b  a) (t+ 1) (uh   ul) + ul (1  2t) ( b +  p) + 2uh (2t  1)
3 (uh   ul)
xl =
(b  2a) (t+ 1) (uh   ul) + ul (2  t) ( b +  p) + 2uh (t  2)
3(uh   ul)
We can write the following:
Proposition 4 Whatever the level of trade costs, home bias raises the equilibrium price and quan-
tity of the low quality variant with respect to the baseline, while it raises the equilibrium price and
the corresponding quantity of the high quality good i¤ t < 1=2:
Proof. @p

h
@
=  1
3
(2t  1)  2uh+ bul+ pul
t+1
> 0 i¤ 2t   1 < 0; @ph
@ b
=
@ph
@ p
=  1
3
ul
2t 1
t+1
> 0 i¤
2t  1 < 0
@pl
@
=  1
3
(t  2)  2uh+ bul+ pul
t+1
> 0 and @p

l
@ b
=
@pl
@ p
=  1
3
ul
t 2
t+1
> 0
@xh
@
= 1
3
(1  2t)  2uh+ bul+ pul
uh ul > 0 i¤ 2t   1 < 0 and
@xh
@ b
=
@xh
@ p
=  1
3
ul
2t 1
uh ul > 0 i¤
2t  1 < 0
@xl
@
=  1
3
(t  2)  2uh+ bul+ pul
uh ul > 0;
@xl
@ b
=
@xl
@ p
=   ul
3uh 3ul (t  2) > 0
Notice that with respect to the previous scenario, in this case home bias raises the equilibrium
price and the corresponding quantity of the low quality variant. Also, di¤erently from the previous
case, where both the demand were increasing in ; in this setting the demand of the high-quality
good raises i¤ trade is not very liberalized.
When considering the role of trade, given    ((uh ul)(2b a)+4uh)
2ul
; we obtain that
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Proposition 5 The reduction of trade costs (i) reduces the price of the high-quality good and the
low quality good; (ii) it increases the quantity sold by rms h and l if and only if ( p +  b) <  .
Proof. @p

h
@t
= 2uh  bul  pul
(t+1)2
< 0
@pl
@t
= 2uh  bul  pul
(t+1)2
< 0
@xh
@t
= (2b a)(uh ul)+2(2uh ( b+ p)ul)
3(uh ul) > 0 and
@xl
@t
= (b 2a)(uh ul)+(2uh ( b+ p)ul)
3(uh ul) > 0 i¤
( p +  b) <
((uh ul)(2b a)+4uh)
2ul
In this case, we observe a kind of symmetric e¤ect with respect to the previous scenario. Both
equilibrium prices decrease with t, while the low-quality variant increases with the reduction of
trade costs if and only if the home bias component is not very strong.
Comparing this equilibrium conguration with the benchmark, we get:
Proposition 6 The demand and the price of the high quality variant are higher under home bias
than in the benchmark i¤ trade costs are relatively low (t < 1=2), whereas the price of the low-
quality variant and its corresponding demand are higher under the home bias scenario than in the
benchmark, whatever the level of trade costs decrease.
Proof. ph  ph = 13 (1  2t)  2uh+ bul+ bult+1 > 0, (1  2t) > 0 while pl  pl = 13 (2  t)  2uh+ bul+ pult+1 >
0 and xh  xh = 13 (1  2t)  2uh+ bul+ puluh ul > 0, (1  2t) > 0 while xl  xl = 13 (2  t)
 2uh+ bul+ pPul
uh ul >
0
It is thus interesting to conclude that the e¤ects of ethnocentric consumption in open economies
change depending on the features of the country where this type of culture is widespread. In
particular, we observe that consumption home bias always raises the price and the demand of the
good which is produced in the ethnocentric country. Also, when home bias arises in country l;
namely when a home bias culture is not generated by a better quality of the product, both the
price and the demand of the high-quality product can even decrease when trade cost get smaller.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we dene a model with two countries and two vertically di¤erentiated goods, a high
and a low quality variant, and heterogenous consumers with respect to their willingness to pay
for quality. Consumers in one country are ethnocentric in consumption. They thrive additional
satisfaction when consuming a domestic good rather than a foreign one, since only the former can
satisfy their sense of place. We investigate the role of trade costs and ethnocentric attitude in
shaping the equilibrium conguration of the international duopoly.
Beyond the fact of providing a model for analyzing home bias, the main result of our analysis
is that home bias consumption increases both the price and the quantity of the domestic good.
The e¤ect on the price and quantity of the foreign good depends on the level of trade costs.
Three possible extensions of this analysis are feasible. First, the analysis should be extended to
the case where home bias appears in both countries simultaneously. Furthermore, it would be also
interesting to examine the results obtained assuming a homogeneous good in Cournot competition
with a set of ethnocentric consumers in both countries. Finally, one could combine the above
analysis with di¤erent density of populations in both countries. More generally, the analysis of
home bias can be extended through a microeconomic approach.
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